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 La formation d ’ une coutume communautaire est-elle concevable ? Les trait é s sont 
encore trop r é cents pour en juger. Mais en soi, il ne faut pas exclure la possibilit é , en 
pr é sence surtout des nombreuses lacunes des trait é s, que des usages s ’ implantent, 
qu ’ ils soient accept é s par les institutions et par les Etats membres et que, pour fi nir, 
une conviction juridique vienne  à s ’ installer  à ce sujet.  … Il n ’ est pas exclu que des 
conventions puissent s ’ é tablir sous forme coutumi è re. 
 P Pescatore,  L ’ ordre juridique des Communaut é s europ é ennes — Etude des sources du droit 
communautaire (Li è ge, Presses universitaires de Li è ge, 1975) 174 
 I. Introduction 
 Focusing on European Union customary law (EUCL) in a discussion pertaining 
to the general principles of EU law (EUGP) may sound surprising at fi rst. Why 
broach one source of EU law, and a prima facie practically irrelevant one at that, 
to address another one ? It is precisely because they are both (unwritten) sources 
of EU law that their comparison and relationship are arguably relevant. And this 
even more so as it is from the perspective of the doctrine of the sources of EU law 
that I propose to approach EUGP in this chapter. 
 What is striking about EUGP is their disproportionate quantitative and qualita-
tive importance in EU law 1 by comparison to what is the case both in domestic 
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 In contrast to what applies in domestic law 5 and in international law, 6 fi rst of 
all, there is hardly any mention in practice of customary law among the unwritten 
sources of EU law. This is surprising because EU law is usually conceived of either 
as a regional regime of international (organisation) law or as a special municipal 
legal order. Even if it is correctly conceived as neither, it is striking to encoun-
ter a legal order that does not, or only rarely, recognises customary law among 
its sources. 7 This is even more peculiar as the role of EUCL has been limited in 
practice since the inception of the EU legal order. As a matter of fact, it is still a 
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relatively young legal order and unwritten law should therefore be called to play an 
important gap-fi lling role, 8 as confi rmed ironically by the comparatively impor-
tant gap-fi lling function of EUGP in EU law. Actually, even in long-established 
domestic legal orders where material customary law tends to diminish in rele-
vance, customary law is still called to play a role in the institutional or constitu-
tional realm. 9 And the same could be said of the regional or functional customary 
law that often develops through established inter-state or institutional practice 
within international organisations (IOs). 10 
 Secondly, in contrast to domestic and international law, there are no discus-
sions in practice pertaining to the relationship between EUGP and EUCL. This 
is equally surprising because general principles are usually regarded, either inter-
changeably or at the same time, as both a type of norms and a source, at least in 
domestic and international law. This raises the diffi culty of their relationship to 
other sources of law and especially to unwritten sources such as customary law. 
In fact, customary law is the source of many general principles of law  qua norms, 
thus making its relationship to general principles  qua source even more ambigu-
ous. This may be exemplifi ed by reference to the debate surrounding the legal 
positivist understanding of general principles, 11 and especially the idea of  ‘ judicial 
custom ’  qua social source of these principles in a legal order. Finally, general prin-
ciples and customary law are not only both unwritten sources of law, but share 
common features in their process of identifi cation and formation, thereby making 
the distinction between them often diffi cult. These three issues are well known in 
international law where the confl ation between general principles and custom-
ary international law is common. The relationships between both sources are also 
frequently considered in domestic law. 
 Of course, the lack of existence or relevance of EUCL in practice depends on 
which practice one considers. To start with, there is very little discussion of EUCL 
in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 12 for reasons 
commonalities on sources from one legal order to the other in practice. Thus, even if having customary 
law among its sources is a contingent feature of the domestic and international legal orders, it is worth 
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that I will identify and discuss later. True, this need not be representative of the rest 
of the practice of EU law. EUCL can arise from inter-institutional or inter-state 
practice and may, as a result, be identifi ed and, arguably, even validated by other 
EU institutions than the CJEU. Besides, one should not underestimate the role 
of scholarship in the acknowledgement of the existence and relevance of a given 
source in the legal practice. This is because of the role of the doctrine of sources 
in the latter ’ s functioning. Just as curiously, however, there has been very little 
scholarly interest in EUCL to date, 13 and even less so in its relationship to EUGP. 14 
 Most of the EU law literature that discusses EUCL is quite ancient. Moreover, it 
stems from French-speaking or Dutch-speaking EU law scholarship, thereby con-
fi rming, of course, how little interest there has been overall for the topic of sources 
in EU law in English-speaking scholarship over time. 15 All the same, the little EU 
law literature there is about EUCL is generally favourable to it and emphasises its 
interesting features. 16 Curiously, even the literature on international law in the EU 
legal order, and how both legal orders infl uence each other, does not pick up on 
EUCL. International lawyers and EU external relations lawyers alike focus on cus-
tomary international law (CIL) and how it has been received within EU law (eg its 
validity, rank and effects) or, conversely, how the EU ’ s practice has been contribut-
ing to the identifi cation and/or formation of CIL 17 — whether on its own, in the 
EU ’ s respective spheres of competence, or in lieu of and for its Member States as 
 13  See eg  B  de Witte ,  ‘ Sources and the Subjects of International Law :  The EU and the Sources of 
International Law ’ in  S  Besson and  J  d ’ Aspremont (eds),  Oxford Handbook on the Sources of Interna-
tional Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2018 ,  forthcoming ) ; Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9);  D 
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practised by other IOs. 18 This neglect is particularly intriguing as the existence of 
EUCL defi nitely affects the contribution of the EU to the development of CIL. Of 
course, the latter may occur without EUCL, but the existence of EUCL conditions 
the development of some norms of CIL, such as international human rights law. 
Generally speaking, the existence of customary law internal to an IO is approached 
by international law scholars exclusively from the perspective of its contribution 
to CIL (or, worse, as subsequent international treaty practice under Article 31(3)
(c) of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (VCLT)), and rarely as a source 
of IO law in itself and hence as functional or regional customary law. 19 
 The neglect of EUCL, and its relationship to EUGP, in both the practice and 
scholarship of EU law is even more surprising as the stakes in matters relative to 
the sources of law are high in any legal order. This should be true of the EU legal 
order as well. Among these stakes, one should, fi rst of all, mention the concern 
for the legitimacy of EU law. Sources should indeed be organised in such a way 
that the EU law they produce can claim legitimate authority. Given the specifi ci-
ties of the EU legal order, the duality of its subjects (individuals and states), and 
in particular its democratic claims to inclusion and participation, 20 the issue of 
the legitimacy of EUCL and EUGP arises differently than in either domestic or 
international law, but especially in the latter. A second stake is the allocation and 
balance of powers, both horizontally among EU institutions (Article 13(2) TEU) 
and vertically among the EU and its Member States (Articles 4(1)(3) and 5(1)(2) 
TEU). Sources of EU law should indeed be organised so as to respect that idiosyn-
cratic balance. Again, these procedural constraints differ from what may apply 
in the domestic legal order, but especially also in the international legal order. 
A third concern is a constitutional one. Sources of EU law should be organised 
so as to respect the constraints set by the EU constitutional order, 21 and espe-
cially within the EU Treaties. This hierarchical dimension of the sources of EU law 
distinguishes them from those of the international legal order in particular, and 
affects both EUCL and EUGP and their potential relationship. 
 There are many reasons one could put forward for the comparative imbalance 
between EUCL and EUGP in the EU legal order. Some are inherent to the Union ’ s 
supranational nature and idiosyncratic democratic legitimacy, whereas others 
pertain to changes in the relationship between EU law and international law, in the 
allocation of powers horizontally between EU institutions or vertically between 
 18  See eg  J  Wouters and  P  De Man ,  ‘ International Organizations as Law-Makers ’ in  J  Klabbers and 
 Å  Wallendahl (eds),  Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations ( Cheltenham , 
 Edward Elgar ,  2011 )  190 – 224 ; Third report (A/CN.4/682) on identifi cation of customary interna-
tional law presented by Sir Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, on the sixty-seventh session of the ILC, 
27 March 2015, 46 – 54. 
 19  See eg  JE  Alvarez ,  International Organizations as Law-Makers ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press , 
 2005 ) . See, however, Peters (n 10). 
 20  See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) para 29. 
 21  See ibid, para 29. See, more generally, eg  Opinion 2/13 (Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU) 
EU:C:2014:2454, para 158. 
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the EU and the Member States, and in the role of the CJEU and its case law in 
the EU legal order. As I will argue, some of these reasons are under strain cur-
rently, thereby leading to potential developments in the practice of EUCL. Under-
standing the specifi cities of EU law with respect to EUCL, and its relationship to 
EUGP, and the reasons for these peculiarities of the EU legal order in comparison 
to both domestic and international law constitutes this chapter ’ s fi rst aim. Its sec-
ond objective is to explain why and how some EUGP could be better approached 
as EUCL. 
 Accordingly, my argument will be three pronged. In section II, I will briefl y 
account for three theoretical issues pertaining to general principles in EU law: 
their types, sources and functions in the EU legal order in comparison to domestic 
and international law. Section III will address EUCL and especially its types and 
functions, but also how it differs from other written and unwritten sources of EU 
law, how it relates to them and why it has had so little relevance in practice, still 
by comparison to domestic and international law. In section IV, I will argue for a 
stronger relationship between EUGP and EUCL in terms of sources of EU law. I 
will illustrate the importance of doing so with respect to EU fundamental rights 
which are the epitome of EUGP. 
 II. General Principles in EU Law 
 General principles are broadly used and referred to throughout the EU Treaties 
and within the CJEU ’ s case law. Interestingly, general principles have a specifi c 
nature (II.A), specifi c sources (II.B) and a specifi c role (II.C) in EU law in com-
parison to what applies in domestic and international law. 
 A. Types of General Principles in EU Law 
 In a nutshell, EUGP can be understood as legal principles, ie as (i) fundamental 
legal norms that are (ii) structurally indeterminate. 22 
 As it is the case domestically and internationally, the addition of the qualifi ca-
tions  ‘ general ’ and/or  ‘ fundamental ’ does not bring much to the extent that all 
legal principles are usually both general and fundamental. Although principles 
may apply to public authorities or to individuals, 23 this article focuses on general 
principles of public law, ie on principles that apply to public authorities whether 
EU Member States or EU institutions. These general principles can also be referred 
to as constitutional principles. 
 22  See Guastini (n 2). 
 23  See Arnull (n 1). 
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 There are four types of general principles in EU law. EU lawyers, like interna-
tional lawyers, are familiar, fi rst of all, with general principles  ‘ common to the laws 
of the Member States ’ that stem from common domestic traditions such as EU 
fundamental rights; second, with  ‘ general principles of international law ’ such as 
 pacta sunt servanda ; and, third,  ‘ general principles of EU law ’ such as direct appli-
cability that are specifi c to the functioning of the EU. This third category entails all 
general principles that pertain to the constitutional and institutional articulation 
and organisation of the EU. 24 EU law also knows of a fourth category of general 
principles, however, that comes close to the general principles one fi nds in domes-
tic law:  ‘ general principles of law ’ . These are the principles one encounters in any 
domestic legal system in Europe, such as legal security in particular. 
 B. Sources of General Principles in EU Law 
 In terms of sources, EUGP are both considered a type of EU legal norm and 
a source of EU (unwritten) primary law. 25 One may derive the latter from 
Article 263(1) and Article 340(2) TFEU in particular. 
 Of course, general principles of EU law  qua source of EU law include as a prior-
ity general principles that stem from common domestic traditions. There is actu-
ally an important mutuality of general principles that arise from domestic law, 
become European general principles and infl uence domestic principles in return. 
This has been the case for the principle of proportionality, in particular. 
 Interestingly, the CJEU is quite specifi c regarding the method and criteria for 
the identifi cation of the EUGP it considers as a source of EU law, ie those stem-
ming from common domestic traditions. Denys Simon refers to that method as 
a  ‘ m é thode  é clectique, s é lective et fi ltrante ’ . 26 The CJEU starts by a comparative 
law analysis, although it has done so less and less rigorously in recent times and 
leaves it to the Advocate General in most cases. 27 The criteria are, fi rst of all, a 
commonality test that does not usually require unanimity among states or even 
a majority thereof; 28 and, secondly, a transposability test the success of which 
depends on how well the principles fi t the overall structure and objectives of 
 24  See von Bogdandy (n 1);  N  Tsagourias ,  ‘ The Constitutional Role of General Principles of Law in 
International and European Jurisprudence ’ in  N  Tsagourias (ed),  Transnational Constitutionalism —
 International and European Models ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2007 )  71 – 106 . 
 25  See  P  Pescatore ,  ‘ Les principes g é n é raux du droit en tant que source du droit communautaire ’ 
in  P  Pescatore (ed),  É tudes de droit communautaire europ é en 1962 – 2007 ( Bruxelles ,  Bruylant ,  2008 ) 
 691 – 730 . 
 26  See Simon,  ‘ Y a-t-il des Principes G é n é raux ’ (n 1) and Simon,  ‘ Les principes en droit 
communautaire ’ (n 1). 
 27  See Arnull (n 1). 
 28  See Opinion of AG Lagrange in  Case C-14/61  Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en 
Staalfabrieken v ECSC High Authority [ 1962 ]  ECR 485 EU:C:1962:19 . 
112 Samantha Besson
the EU. 29 In view of the case law, the two tests tend to merge into one another as 
certain domestic traditions are held to be compatible with the general objectives 
of the EU and hence to be suffi ciently common, while others do not for the very 
same reasons. 30 
 EUGP also have other sources than domestic general principles, and in particu-
lar (written) primary EU law, but also the CJEU ’ s case law. 
 Starting with the latter, fi rst of all, whether one sees the CJEU as only interpret-
ing and specifying the EUGP one fi nds in EU primary law, or actually as creating 
them or turning them into EU law through judicial custom, its case law is crucial 
to general principles. Judicial law amounts indeed to the most important source of 
legal principles as the latter need to be identifi ed, but also interpreted even if they 
are guaranteed legally and pre-exist judicial interpretation. By nature, legal prin-
ciples require interpretation and a normative assessment in every case. Arguably, 
not only do legal principles require the judiciary, 31 but judges need legal principles 
to exercise their functions fully. 32 
 As in domestic and international law, secondly, general principles are gradually 
specifi ed and codifi ed into primary or secondary EU law. As I explained before, 
this does not prevent their judicial interpretations from developing them further 
(see eg Article 6(3) TEU in the context of EU fundamental rights). The distinc-
tion between written and unwritten general principles is fl uid, as a result. Implicit 
principles often get codifi ed and become explicit, but they subsist as implicit 
principles. Implicit principles may actually also be extracted from explicit ones 
through interpretation. As a result, codifi ed principles may impact on codifi ed law 
through a retroaction process. 
 The CJEU has not yet defi ned a strict method as to how to identify those 
general principles of EU law that do not stem from primary EU law — and do not 
derive from domestic traditions  qua autonomous source of EU law either. 33 This 
may be explained by the unease the idea of judicial law creates in general. 34 By 
contrast to international law, however, the issue is not so much the lack of hier-
archy or exclusivity of the judiciary and its lack of compulsory jurisdiction or of 
 29  See  Case C-11/70  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle f ü r Getreide 
und Futtermittel [ 1970 ]  ECR 1125 EU:C:1970:114 , para 4. 
 30  Compare Case C-159/90  Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland v Grogan 
and others [ 1991 ]  ECR I-4685 EU:C:1991:378 or  Case C-341/05  Laval un Partneri [ 2007 ]  ECR 
I-11767 EU:C:2007:809 with  Case C-36/02  Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH 
v Oberb ü rgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [ 2004 ]  ECR I-09609 EU:C:2004:614 , paras 34ff. 
 31  See also  P  Brunet ,  ‘ Les principes g é n é raux du droit et la hi é rarchie des normes ’ in  D  de B é chillon , 
 P  Brunet ,  V  Champeil-Desplats and  E  Millard (eds),  L ’ architecture du droit. M é langes en l ’ honneur de 
Michel Troper ( Paris ,  Economica ,  2006 )  207 – 21 . 
 32  See eg Groussot (n 1) 105ff. 
 33  See eg the discussion pertaining to the existence of a general principle of equality of shareholders 
or of abuse of law in the  Case C-101/08  Audiolux and Others [ 2009 ]  ECR I-9823 EU:C:2009:626 and 
 Case C-255/02  Halifax and Others [ 2006 ]  ECR I-1609 EU:C:2006:121 . 
 34  See Herdegen and Wolters (n 1). 
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democratic legitimacy and accountability. One may indeed argue that the CJEU, 
and the European judicial dialogue that is so specifi c to the European legal order 
 lato sensu , have actually developed in the way they did through the elaboration of 
general principles. 35 Rather, the challenge to judicially created EUGP has to do 
with the vertical and horizontal division of powers within the EU, on the one 
hand, and between the EU and its Member States, on the other. 36 Recent case 
law shows how justifi ed these fears about a general principles ’  ‘ competence creep ’ 
are. 37 Interestingly, the CJEU has actually responded to those concerns recently by 
not over-interpreting general principles. 38 
 Finally, in terms of rank, it follows from the nature and role of EUGP that they 
need to be interpreted and specifi ed when applied in concrete circumstances and, 
in most cases, balanced against other legal principles. Their balancing is guided 
by the moral and political values they protect. It cannot indeed occur by reference 
to a formal hierarchy of legal norms: principles stem from different sources, on 
the one hand, and even when they stem from one single source such as judicial 
law, they are meant to refer the interpreter to moral values and hence relate to an 
axiological hierarchy and not a legal one, on the other. This becomes clear when 
one thinks of constitutional principles whose constitutional nature can derive  à la 
fois from their constitutional entrenchment and from their use in constitutional 
judgements, without any difference being made either way as to their rank in case 
of balancing. In the context of EU law, one may actually consider that the consti-
tutional function of (most) general principles, combined with their normative 
importance, would justify granting them constitutional rank in most cases. 39 This 
has consequences in turn for the formal hierarchy of sources within EU law: if 
there is a hierarchy between EUGP and EU primary law, indeed, it is a material one 
at most (see also Article 52(4) EU Fundamental Rights Charter (EUFRC) a fortiori 
regarding EU fundamental rights). And the same may be said of their relations to 
one another. 
 35  See Groussot (n 1). 
 36  See  S  Prechal ,  ‘ Competence Creep and General Principles of Law ’ ( 2010 )  3  Review of European 
Administrative Law  5 – 22 . Contra:  K  Lenaerts and  J  Gutierrez Fons ,  ‘ The Constitutional Allocation of 
Powers in the EU and General Principles ’ ( 2010 )  47  Common Market Law Review  1629 – 69, 1630 . 
 37  See eg in the EU fundamental rights context:  Case C-34/09  Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi ce 
national de l ’ emploi (ONEm) [ 2011 ]  ECR I-1177 EU:C:2011:124 . See eg in the EU private law context: 
 Case C-144/04  Werner Mangold v R ü diger Helm [ 2005 ]  ECR I-9981 EU:C:2005:709 ;  Case C-555/07 
 K ü c ü ckdeveci [ 2010 ]  ECR I-365 EU:C:2010:21 ; Case C-176/12  Association de m é diation sociale 
[published in the electronic Reports of Cases] EU:C:2014:2. See  T  Tridimas ,  ‘ Horizontal Effect of Gen-
eral Principles :  Bold Rulings and Fine Distinctions ’ in  U  Bernitz ,  X  Groussot and  F  Schulyok (eds), 
 General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law ( Alphen aan den Rijn ,  Kluwer Law Interna-
tional ,  2013 )  213 – 232 . 
 38  See eg Case C-101/08  Audiolux (n 33); Case C-255/02  Halifax (n 33). See also, most recently, 
Case C-176/12  Association de m é diation sociale (n 37). 
 39  See  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council and Commission [ 2008 ]  ECR I-06351 EU:C:2008:461 , paras 307 – 08 (on fundamental rights); 
 Opinion 2/13 (n 21) para 191 (on mutual trust). 
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 C. Functions of General Principles in EU Law 
 The functions of general principles in EU law follow closely the different functions 
general principles have in domestic law, but also in international law. 40 General 
principles are both an aid to and a constraint on the judicial interpretation of 
EU law. 41 Their reference to values helps to justify other EU law norms, but also 
contributes to the development of the rule of law in EU law and hence to the 
legitimacy of EU law as a whole. 
 The two functions of general principles one can distinguish in domestic and 
international law, ie gap-fi lling and coherence, can also be identifi ed in the CJEU ’ s 
practice. They have evolved both quantitatively and qualitatively in the EU legal 
order, however. 
 General principles helped to fi ll gaps, fi rst of all, while EU law was develop-
ing. It seems from the recent case law, however, that there are too many potential 
principles available currently and that the CJEU often chooses to leave a gap open 
nowadays rather than fi ll it with yet another principle. 42 One may also observe 
how general principles codifi ed in EU primary law are constantly being reinter-
preted by the CJEU, thus ensuring a dynamic understanding of EU law. In qualita-
tive terms too, the gap-fi lling function has turned into an intervalidation function 
where general principles allow principles to be transferred from one legal order to 
the other, and in particular from domestic or international law into EU law, while 
respecting the autonomy of each of the respective legal orders. 
 Secondly, general principles also ensure the coherence of EU law. Here again, 
coherence has evolved with EU law and the greater integration between legal 
orders in the EU. Although their invocation does not imply hierarchy or unity, 
general principles contribute to the integrity of the European legal order  lato sensu 
and hence preserve the legal pluralism that prevails between the EU legal order 
and that of its Member States. 43 General principles can even be regarded as a way 
of providing materially superior norms and a transitive normative hierarchy that 
can allow EU law and general international law to be articulated in richer terms 
than dualist ones within the European legal order  lato sensu . 44 
 III. EU Customary Law 
 Although it is the most important unwritten source of law in both domestic and 
international law, customary law has received very little recognition in the practice 
 40  See Guastini (n 2). 
 41  See also Bengoetxea (n 1). 
 42  See Case C-101/08  Audiolux (n 33) and Case C-255/02  Halifax (n 33). 
 43  See  S  Besson ,  ‘ From European Integration to European Integrity. Should European Law Speak 
with Just One Voice? ’ ( 2004 )  10  European Law Journal  257 – 81 . 
 44  See eg Opinion of AG Maduro in  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council and Commission [ 2008 ]  ECR I-6351 EU:C:2008:11 . 
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and scholarship of EU law. In what follows, and by reference to the structure of 
the discussion of EUGP adopted in the previous section, I will consider the differ-
ent types of EUCL one encounters in practice (III.A), their relationship to other 
sources of EU law (III.B) and their various functions (III.C), always by compari-
son to what is the case in domestic and international law. 
 A. Types of EU Customary Law 
 EUCL can be understood, like customary law in general, as a normative practice, 
ie (i) a general, coherent and regular practice (ii) regarded as law and hence as 
legally binding. 
 Confi rmation of the applicability of the so-called two-element doctrine in EU 
law may be found in the CJEU ’ s case law. 45 There is very little information in 
that very case law, however, about how these criteria actually work. Of course, 
as I explained before, the CJEU ’ s case law is extremely limited on EUCL in gen-
eral and the reasoning pertaining to its ascertainment even more. Domestic and 
international courts are not usually very specifi c about the criteria they use for the 
determination of customary law in any case. 
 Depending on the identity of the subjects and the object of customary law, 
one may distinguish between different types of EUCL: inter-individual, inter- 
institutional and/or inter-state EUCL; and material and/or constitutional EUCL. 
 First of all, the subjects of EUCL could be any of the subjects of EU law: indi-
viduals, EU institutions or EU Member States. This is what one would expect from 
a comparison with domestic and international customary law. The subjects of any 
norm of customary law are indeed those practising what could thereby become 
a custom. In EU law, EUCL has developed mostly between EU institutions and/
or between EU Member States. This is a consequence of the object of EUCL, as 
we will see next, but also of the sheer scope of the general EU practice needed to 
give rise to inter-individual EUCL and the diffi culty of meeting that condition in 
practice at EU level. As it is the case in international law, inter-state EUCL may also 
arise from a suffi ciently general, regular and coherent intrastate practice. 
 Secondly, EUCL may be either material or institutional depending on whether 
its object is any part of EU material law or only EU institutional law. This is a 
distinction one encounters within domestic customary law where customary law 
has progressively, and primarily due to its gradual codifi cation, become mostly 
institutional or constitutional. Constitutional customary law is also referred to 
domestically as  ‘ constitutional custom ’ or  ‘ constitutional convention ’ . In EU law, 
constitutional customary law is also the most common type of EUCL one can 
encounter. 46 Its norms pertain to various constitutional aspects of the EU, and in 
 45  See  Case C-230/81  Luxembourg v Parliament [ 1983 ]  ECR 255 EU:C:1983:32 , para 44. 
 46  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 217; Jacqu é (n 9) 377. 
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particular to inter-institutional relations or intra-institutional organisation. How-
ever, this does not preclude the development of material EUCL, in principle. In 
this chapter, I will focus on constitutional EUCL, whether it is inter-institutional 
or inter-state, as this provides a nice contrast to the constitutional EUGP discussed 
in the previous section. 
 The examples of constitutional EUCL one fi nds in practice may be organised 
under two headings: inter-institutional and inter-state. 47 There are more examples 
of the former than of the latter, for reasons that have to do with the jurisgenerative 
effects of the self-organisation powers of EU institutions and their duties of loyal 
co-operation. 48 
 Of course, examples of EUCL are mostly historical to the extent that EUCL, 
once it is suffi ciently established to be qualifi ed as such, is often rapidly codifi ed 
into EU primary law for reasons of legal security. Inter-institutional EUCL is also 
often turned into inter-institutional agreements. To that extent, EUCL may be 
compared to EUGP whose relationship to EU primary law is dynamic and char-
acterised by the toing and froing of codifi cation and interpretation processes. 
Among historical examples of norms of inter-institutional EUCL, on the one 
hand, one may mention the 1966 Compromis du Luxembourg 49 or the Parlia-
ment ’ s role in the consultation procedure. 50 Both practices arose as custom and 
were then codifi ed into EU primary law. Historical examples of inter-state EUCL, 
on the other, may be found in the EU standards for enlargement 51 or for the elec-
tion of CJEU judges (Article 255 TFEU). 
 As I explained in the introduction, it is diffi cult to fi nd many examples of EUCL 
in the CJEU ’ s case law. The latter only rarely mentions inter-institutional prac-
tices, and, even more rarely, inter-state practices. When it does, moreover, it does 
not refer to them expressly as  ‘ customary ’ . The only exception is Advocate General 
Maduro ’ s 2007 Opinion which refers explicitly to  ‘ extra-statutory customs ’ and to 
 ‘ precedents ’ from the institutions or Member States. 52 
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court ’ s reasoning is also usually very brief. The 
CJEU ’ s case law on EUCL confi rms the distinction between inter-institutional and 
inter-state customary law, albeit not nominally, of course. The Court has never 
accepted a case of inter-state customary law to date. The reasons given are either 
that such law could be equated to an amendment of the EU Treaties contrary 
to Article 48 TEU, as in the  Defrenne I case, 53 or that it would be overriding or 
 47  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 221 – 22, 225 – 38, 244 – 47; Blumann and Dubouis (n 15) 
455 – 56. 
 48  See Jacqu é (n 9) 381 – 93. 
 49  See eg Blumann and Dubouis (n 15) 260ff; Craig and G de B ú rca (n 15) 134 – 35. 
 50  See  Case C-138/79  Roquette fr è res [ 1980 ]  ECR 3333 EU:C:1980:249 ;  Case C-65/93  Parliament 
v Council [ 1995 ]  ECR I-643 EU:C:1995:91 . 
 51  See  Case C-93/78  Mattheus v Doego [ 1978 ]  ECR 2203 EU:C:1978:206 . See also Kochenov (n 13). 
 52  See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) paras 27 – 29. 
 53  See  Case C-43/75  Defrenne v Sabena (Defrenne I) [ 1976 ]  ECR 455 EU:C:1976:56 , paras 57 – 58; 
 Case C-59/75  Manghera [ 1976 ]  ECR 91 EU:C:1976:14 , paras 19 – 21. 
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derogating from them. 54 The Court ’ s concern seems to be the protection of the 
settlements agreed at times of Treaty revisions. The Court has been equally hard 
on  ‘ negative practice ’ or custom when it is invoked to derogate from a norm of EU 
primary law that is no longer practised. 55 It has been more generous in recognising 
instances of inter-institutional customary law, 56 however. 57 Thus, one could men-
tion the confi rmation by the Court of the legality of a resolution of the Parliament 
to hold meetings of its committees and political groups in Brussels 58 or the legality 
of the management committee procedure. 59 
 At fi rst sight, this reluctance of the Court is surprising because, whether in 
domestic or international law, courts are the ones vested with the pre-enforcement 
identifi cation of customary law, and arguably with its validation. There are many 
reasons one could venture, however. The fi rst one, of course, and the most chari-
table one, is the lack of relevance of EUCL in practice and hence the few custom-
ary norms to actually enforce. The second reason may be that the CJEU in reality 
resorts to other sources to do what a domestic or international court would usu-
ally do with customary law. As a matter of fact, the CJEU uses general principles 
to fi ll gaps or to specify indeterminate EU law norms, both functions customary 
law usually fulfi ls in domestic and international law. 60 This is not surprising given 
how closely related judicial reasoning and general principles are to one another in 
general. Nor should it come as a surprise given how unconstrained judicial law-
making generally is in EU law, by comparison to domestic law, but especially to 
international law. 
 As I argued before, however, the lack of recognition of EUCL in judicial 
practice does not take anything away from the latter ’ s independently acquired 
validity through practice. Nor does it prevent other EU institutions, such as the 
Council or the Commission, from recognising it, and thereby arguably validating 
it, if need be. 
 54  See  Case C-174/84  Bulk Oil [ 1986 ]  ECR 559 EU:C:1986:60 , para 65;  Case C-68/86  United 
 Kingdom v Council [ 1988 ]  ECR 855 EU:C:1988:85 , para 24;  Case C-327/91  France v Commission 
[ 1994 ]  ECR I-3641 EU:C:1994:305 , para 36;  Opinion 1/94 [ 1994 ]  ECR I-5267 EU:C:1994:384 , para 52; 
 Case C-426/93  Germany v Council [ 1995 ]  ECR I-3723 EU:C:1995:367 , para 21;  Case C-271/94  Parlia-
ment v Council [ 1996 ]  ECR I-1689 EU:C:1996:133 , para 24;  Case C-84/94  United Kingdom v Council 
[ 1996 ]  ECR I-5755 EU:C:1996:431 , para 19;  Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council [ 2008 ]  ECR I-3189 
EU:C:2008:257 , paras 55 – 57, 59 – 60. See also Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament 
v Council (n 12) paras 26 – 35. See also Jacqu é (n 9) 401; Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 240 – 41. 
 55  See  Case C-7/71  Commission v France [ 1971 ]  ECR 1003 EU:C:1971:121 , paras 18 – 22, 23 – 26. 
 56  See  Case C-25/70  Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle f ü r Getreide und Futtermittel v K ö ster and Berodt 
 & Co [ 1970 ]  ECR 1161 EU:C:1970:115 , paras 6 – 9; Case C-230/81  Luxembourg v Parliament (n 45) 
paras 43 – 46, 48 – 49;  Case C-149/85  Wybot [ 1986 ]  ECR 2391 EU:C:1986:310 , paras 16 – 17; 
 Case C-137/10  R é gion de Bruxelles-Capitale [ 2011 ]  ECR I-3515 EU:C:2011:280 , paras 19 – 22; Opinion 
of AG Cruz-Villalon in  Case C-137/10  R é gion de Bruxelles-Capitale [ 2011 ]  ECR I-3515 EU:C:2011:16 , 
paras 48 – 49. 
 57  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 242 – 47. 
 58  See Case C-230/81  Luxembourg v Parliament (n 45) paras 43 – 46, 48 – 49. 
 59  See Case C-25/70  K ö ster (n 56) paras 6 – 9. 
 60  See eg Kolb (n 3); Tridimas (n 1). 
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 B. EU Customary Law and the Other Sources of EU Law 
 One of the features of the EU legal order, especially by comparison to interna-
tional law, is that its sources are ranked by reference to one another. One may see 
this as a sign of the constitutionalisation of EU law, but the hierarchy of sources of 
EU law may also be justifi ed more generally on grounds of procedural legitimacy. 
 While EU primary law is usually ranked fi rst and EU secondary law last, a 
growing trend in recent years has been the distinction, within EU primary law, 
between a constitutional and superior tier of EU primary law, which includes EU 
fundamental rights, 61 and a lower tier. This has consequences in turn for the rank 
of EUCL in the EU legal order. That rank matters, fi rst, by reference to written 
sources such as EU primary and secondary law, but also, second, to non-written 
sources of EU law such as EUGP. 
 (i) EU Customary Law and the Written Sources of EU Law 
 Like EUGP, EUCL is dynamic in its relationship to written EU law. Once it is suf-
fi ciently established, it is often codifi ed into written law. Of course, nothing pre-
vents codifi ed EUCL from being interpreted specifi cally or differently and hence 
from giving rise to a new subsequent practice and hence to a new custom. 
 EUCL, especially when it is constitutional, can be codifi ed ( ‘ germinated ’ ) 62 into 
EU primary law, but also, when it is inter-institutional, into inter-institutional 
agreements. 63 As a matter of fact, EU primary law has been progressively amended 
and made more fl exible through different instruments of amendment/revision, 
and this has enhanced these forms of codifi cation of EUCL even further. Fur-
thermore, the recognition of inter-institutional agreements as a source of binding 
EU law by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 295 TFEU) 64 or the enhanced co-operation 
mechanism (Articles 20 TEU and 328 TFEU) amount to another way in which 
EU Treaties accommodate within EU primary law inter-state or inter-institutional 
practices that may become or already amount to EUCL. The CJEU itself has often 
contributed to the establishment of these constitutional conventions in the mak-
ing, by turning them into correct interpretations of EU primary law. 65 As a result, 
the relationship between EUCL and written sources of EU law is fl uid. 
 Importantly, given the superior rank of EU primary law in the EU legal order, 
EU primary law is taken as setting constraints on the validity of EUCL. This is one 
 61  See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi (n 39) para 285. 
 62  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 231; Jacqu é (n 15) 34 – 35. 
 63  See eg Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 218ff; Blumann and Dubouis (n 15) 455 – 56; Jacqu é 
(n 15) 28ff. 
 64  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 218. 
 65  See eg  Case C-138/79  Roquette fr è res (n 50) paras 33 – 36;  Case C-139/79  Maizena GmbH v Council 
of the European Communities [ 1980 ]  ECR 3393 EU:C:1980:250 , paras 27 – 28. 
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of the key differences between EUCL and customary international law. Constitu-
tional constraints on customary international law are quite common in domestic 
law, however. 66 In EU law, constitutional constraints on EUCL include the fol-
lowing EU primary law rules and principles in particular: rules on the attribution 
of competences (Articles 4(1) and 5(1) TEU) and the principles of institutional 
balance (Article 13(2) TEU), of institutional autonomy and of loyal co-operation 
(Article 4(3) TEU), all of them both inter-state and inter-institutional. 
 Interestingly, most of these constraints are general principles identifi ed by the 
CJEU itself, whether or not they have yet been codifi ed into EU primary law. This 
raises the question of constitutional EUCL and of the applicability of the formal 
priority of rank of EU primary law to that kind of EUCL. This is a problem cur-
rently faced by constitutional EUGP and their relationship to contrary EU pri-
mary law. In these cases, as I explained before, formal hierarchies do not seem to 
help resolving normative confl icts between EUGP and EU primary law norms, 
thereby leaving their resolution to material normative hierarchies. 
 The constitutional equivalence of certain norms of EUCL and EU primary law 
may therefore constitute an exception to the CJEU ’ s ruling that inter-state and 
inter-institutional EUCL may not contradict or derogate from EU primary law. 67 
The justifi cation for this  ‘ rigid ’ approach, to quote Advocate General Maduro, to 
the priority of EU Treaties is the formal procedure of revision of those treaties. 68 
Of course, this argument is understandable when the priority of EU Treaties over 
EUCL is discussed by contrast to the relationship of equivalence between interna-
tional treaties and customary international law. It is also envisaged with respect to 
the relevance of the VCLT in matters of EU Treaties — Article 48 TEU is meant to 
work as a  lex specialis . This is particularly striking with reference to the exclusion 
of subsequent treaty practice under Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, but also of established 
practice under Article 5 VCLT or, more generally, of the possibility of treaty-
derogating customs (indirectly tolerated by Article 39 VCLT). 69 However, once the 
issue is approached from an internal EU constitutional perspective, it is unclear 
that the  ‘ rigid nature of the founding Treaties ’ can be a suffi cient argument in 
order to rank constitutional EUCL below EU primary law. Confl icts between them 
should rather be resolved through balancing and by reference to material norma-
tive hierarchies when they exist. 
 (ii) EU Customary Law and the Other Unwritten Sources of EU Law 
 Even though the relationship between unwritten sources of EU law is not fore-
seen by the formal hierarchy of sources of EU law, it is important to consider it 
 66  See eg Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, 13 June 2013, Judgement 6B_218/2013, para 3.3. 
 67  See Case C-68/86  United Kingdom v Council (n 54) para 24; Case C-7/71  Commission v France 
(n 55) paras 18 – 22, 23 – 26; Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 54) paras 55 – 57, 59 – 60. See also 
Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) paras 26 – 35. 
 68  See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) paras 27 – 29. 
 69  See de Witte (n 13). 
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carefully, not the least because it may affect our discussion of the relationship 
between EUCL and EUGP later in this chapter. 
 Qua unwritten EU law, EUCL should be compared to other unwritten sources 
of binding and non-binding EU law. The latter include gentlemen ’ s agreements 70 
and other non-binding conventions between EU Member States or institutions. 
I will focus on the former in this section: they include EUGP and EU judicial law. 
 First of all, the relationship between EUCL and EUGP. As I explained before, 
customary law and general principles are usually very diffi cult to distinguish. This 
may be explained by reference to the ambivalence about the source of general 
principles that are sometimes regarded as a type of norms and sometimes as both 
a type of norms and a source of these norms. Further, the unwritten nature of 
general principles and the fact that customary law often entails general principles 
also contribute to their frequent confl ation. In international law, the tendency to 
confl ate them has even become strategic since general principles tend to be easier 
to establish procedurally than customary international law for they do not require 
a practice. 71 
 Curiously, in EU law, this discussion has not yet taken place. There is no trace 
of it in the CJEU ’ s case law either. This is even more surprising as many EUGP 
have arisen from inter-state practice, such as EU fundamental rights or the pro-
portionality principle. Moreover, the comparative law method used by the CJEU 
in ascertaining the existence of some EUGP is reminiscent of the method used by 
domestic or international courts to establish the inter-state practice constitutive 
of customary law. Finally, EUGP and EUCL have a certain dependence on judicial 
reasoning and recognition in common. 
 Second, EUCL and judicial law-making by the CJEU. When the Court interprets 
EU law  infra or  praeter legem , it contributes to its development, thereby contribut-
ing to EU law-making writ large. It actually sometimes does so in circumstances 
where there is an existing inter-state and/or inter-institutional practice. The ques-
tion that arises in this context is whether EU judicial law should comply with the 
conditions for the identifi cation or formation of customary law, ie establishing a 
general, coherent and regular practice and  opinio juris , or whether it can expand 
the scope of EU law without constraints. 
 This issue arose in the context of the  Watson and Belmann case in the 1970s. 
Advocate General Trabucchi recommended that the Court ascertained the condi-
tions for an inter-institutional and inter-state  ‘ rule of custom and practice ’ before 
expanding the personal scope of the principle of free movement of persons to 
 70  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 247 – 48. 
 71  See eg ICJ, 15 June 1962,  Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) , 
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962, 23; ICJ, 20 April 2010,  Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) , ICJ Reports 2010, 101. See also  P  d ’ Argent ,  ‘ Les principes g é n é raux  à 
la Cour internationale de Justice ’ in  S  Besson and  P  Pichonnaz (eds),  Les principes en droit europ é en —
 Principles in European Law ( Zurich ,  Schulthess ,  2011 )  107 – 20 . 
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include tourists under EU Treaties. 72 He was not followed by the Court, however. 
The CJEU interpreted EU primary law by extending its personal scope without 
fi rst establishing the existence of an inter-institutional or inter-state custom to that 
extent and without ascertaining the other conditions for the existence of a custom 
in that context. 73 The CJEU ’ s approach to the potential relationship between judi-
cial interpretations of EU law and EUCL confi rms the way in which it identifi es 
and develops general principles in its case law, ie without much attention to their 
sources. EU judicial law or, in the case of EUCL, EU judicial custom seems to be 
self-suffi cient. 74 
 (iii) Functions of EU Customary Law 
 The functions of EUCL are the same as those of customary law in domestic and 
international law. As this was famously captured in Article 1(2) Swiss Civil Code, 
its primary role actually lies in complementing written law. Customary law fi lls the 
gaps left by written law, on the one hand, and helps making it more specifi c when 
it is indeterminate, on the other. 
 This has been confi rmed for EUCL by Advocate General Maduro. 75 The CJEU 
has not been more explicit about the role played by EUCL in the EU legal order. 
What is clear from the Court ’ s practice, however, is that, when there is EU primary 
law in place, EUCL may only be used to develop it  infra or  praeter legem , but never 
 contra legem . EUCL cannot be invoked either to amend 76 or derogate 77 from EU 
primary law. This is a consequence of the primacy of EU primary law mentioned 
before. 
 At fi rst sight, the lack of relevance of EUCL in practice does not come as a sur-
prise given its complementary functions. After all, as has been the case in domestic 
law, the development of the EU legal order and the progressive codifi cation of 
practices imply a reduced relevance of EUCL over time. The diffi culty, however, is 
that it has always been like that in EU law. 78 Moreover, this has been the case both 
for material and constitutional EUCL, whereas domestic constitutional customs 
tend to remain in place and fl ourish even in well-established legal orders. 
 72  Opinion of AG Trabucchi in Case C-118/75  Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185 EU:C:1976:79, 
1204 – 05. 
 73  Case C-118/75  Watson and Belmann [ 1976 ]  ECR 1185 EU:C:1976:106 . 
 74  See also Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 214 – 15; Blumann and Dubouis (n 15) 455 – 56. 
 75  See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) para 29. 
 76  See Case C-43/75  Defrenne I (n 53) paras 57 – 58; Case C-59/75  Manghera (n 53) paras 19 – 21. 
 77  See Case C-7/71  Commission v France (n 55) paras 18 – 22, 23 – 26; Case C-174/84  Bulk Oil (n 54) 
para 65; Case C-68/86  United Kingdom v Council (n 54) para 24; Case C-327/91  France v Commission 
(n 54) para 36;  Opinion 1/94 (n 54) para 52; Case C-426/93  Germany v Council (n 54) para 21; Case 
C-271/94  Parliament v Council (n 54) para 24; Case C-84/94  United Kingdom v Council (n 54) para 
19; Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 54) paras 55 – 57, 59 – 60. See also Opinion of AG Maduro 
in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) paras 26 – 35. See also Jacqu é (n 9) 401; Blanchet and 
Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 240 – 41. 
 78  See also Pescatore (n 8) 174. 
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 The grounds for the sidelining of EUCL are to be found elsewhere, as a result. 
There are at least four reasons one could put forward for the limited role of EUCL 
in the EU legal order: the supranationality of EU law, its democratic legitimacy, its 
complex vertical and horizontal division of powers, and its jurisprudential nature. 
 First of all, the supranationality of EU law. One of the specifi cities of the EU 
 qua international organisation is its supranational nature. This may be verifi ed in 
numerous features of its legal order, but especially in the EU law-making process. 
The sources of EU law are such that EU Member States are no longer the sole law-
makers. This even applies to the EU Treaties whose adoption and revision proce-
dures include EU institutions. Some of them represent the interests of Member 
States albeit on majoritarian grounds (Council), while others represent EU citizens 
(Parliament) or even the interest of the EU itself (Commission) (Article 10 TEU). 
No wonder, then, that a source such as EUCL whose subjects could be either states 
or institutions only does not fare very well in this supranational setting. Of course, 
nothing precludes certain normative practices and hence EUCL from being both 
inter-state and inter-institutional, thereby abiding by the supranational specifi c-
ity of EU law. This was actually Advocate General Trabucchi ’ s argument in the 
context of the free movement practice in  Watson and Belmann . 79 Thus, whereas 
EUCL may at fi rst seem to be at odds with supranational EU law-making, it is in 
fact compatible with it provided it is both inter-state and inter-institutional. 
 Secondly, the democratic legitimacy of EU law. Another characteristic of the 
EU ’ s supranational legal order is that its legitimacy is democratic and hence ulti-
mately grounded in the political equality of EU citizens (Article 9 TEU). More 
specifi cally, it is through the involvement of the European Parliament in most EU 
law-making procedures that EU law ’ s democratic justifi cation is acquired. Even 
if inter-state EUCL may be said to be indirectly democratic to the extent that it 
is through the general practice of democratic Member States that it is adopted, 
the implication of the EU Parliament  qua requirement of supranational democ-
racy is not necessarily given. The same may be noted of some instances of inter-
institutional EUCL in which the equal participation of the European Parliament 
is not necessarily granted. It is without surprise therefore that the lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy also underpins Advocate General Maduro ’ s rejection of deroga-
tory EUCL: he refers to  ‘ EU citizens ’ and to the  ‘ reinforced legitimacy ’ of the EU 
Treaties. 80 Of course, there is a paradox in considering EUCL as lacking indirect 
democratic credentials when EUGP are increasingly used in the CJEU ’ s case law, 
including in order to derogate from EU Treaties, and without any reference to 
either EU citizens ’ or the EU Parliament ’ s approval. 
 Thirdly, the complex horizontal and vertical division of powers in EU law. 
Another feature of the EU legal order is its complex division of powers. It is a 
combination of horizontal (between EU institutions) and vertical (between EU 
 79  Opinion of AG Trabucchi in Case C-118/75  Watson and Belmann (n 72) 1204 – 05. 
 80  See Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-133/06  Parliament v Council (n 12) para 29. 
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Member States and the EU) division, the former replicating some of the latter to 
a certain extent. The way in which EUCL is made may at fi rst be considered as a 
threat to this sensitive balance of powers. 81 After all, even when it arises from a 
combination of inter-state and inter-institutional practice, it is diffi cult to see how 
it could abide perfectly by the constitutional constraints and procedures set by 
the EU Treaties to respect that balance. In those conditions, the fear is that EUCL 
could contribute to the  ‘ competence creep ’ already at work in the EU. Interest-
ingly, however, EUGP themselves have also been criticised for contributing to that 
 ‘ competence creep ’ , as I explained before. In this respect, one may consider the 
combined inter-state and inter-institutional dimension of EUCL as vouching for 
a greater respect of the sensitive vertical and horizontal balance of powers within 
the EU. After all, EUCL derives from inter-state and inter-institutional practice 
and  opinio juris , and hence from what both the Member States and institutions see 
as being the right division of powers in practice. 
 Finally, the jurisprudential nature of EU law. The CJEU has played a crucial role 
in the development of the EU legal order  qua autonomous legal order. Nowhere is 
that role more tangible than in the context of the sources of EU law: they have been 
gradually moulded by the Court, whose role has been to ascertain norms arising 
from these sources and sometimes even to validate them. The lack of case law, 
and of careful reasoning, about EUCL in the Court ’ s practice may be explained 
by the very role the CJEU plays within the EU legal order itself. This came out 
clearly from its reasoning in  Watson and Belmann , and from the hiatus between 
the proposed reasoning in the Advocate General ’ s opinion and the Court ’ s. The 
Court does not see the need to justify its reasoning by grounding it in (other) 
sources of EU law. In turn, this explains why it is not interested in identifying new 
constraints on its reasoning based on inter-state or inter-institutional practice. As 
a matter of fact, this accounts for the comparative advantage of EUGP over EUCL 
for the CJEU: EUGP are easier to establish than EUCL, do not constrain judicial 
reasoning as much as EUCL and fulfi l some of the gap-fi lling functions of EUCL. 
In other words, the CJEU prefers to claim the autonomy of EU law and to avoid 
reliance on EUCL exactly because it gives itself more fl exibility. If it had to identify 
customary principles at Member State level, it could never have decided cases such 
as  Omega or  Mangold in the way it did. 
 Interestingly, some of these grounds for the limited role of EUCL in practice 
are currently under strain. This is because the EU is changing internally, but also 
externally in its relationship to other states and international organisations. 
 First of all, the return of inter-state law in the EU. There has been a clear inter-
governmental trend at play within the EU since 2011. This has in particular led 
to the (re)introduction of international law methods and sources in the relations 
between EU Member States, including on issues which would have been dealt 
with through the  m é thode communautaire and through EU law at earlier times. 
 81  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 213. 
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It suffi ces to mention the various inter-state treaties concluded in the wake of the 
fi nancial crisis since 2008, but also the ways in which these instruments have led to 
the twisting or softening of the EU constitutional framework. 82 Of course, the EU 
Treaty crisis is not a new phenomenon: it has been with us since 2004 and the fail-
ure of the Constitutional Treaty. What is new, however, is that the increased fl exi-
bilisation introduced or revised in the EU Treaties at Lisbon (eg simplifi ed revision 
procedures under Article 48 TEU, fl exibility clause under Article 352 TFEU or 
enhanced co-operation under Article 20 TEU) have not managed to bring EU 
Member States back to EU primary law. On the contrary, Member States have 
retreated into the inter-governmental periphery, both in terms of institutions and 
sources of law-making. Under these circumstances, one should make a virtue of a 
necessity, and bring inter-state conventions and customs back into the scope of EU 
law by broadening the sources of EU law. 83 This would ironically ensure that the 
constitutional and democratic constraints of EU law are respected. Maintaining 
the integrity of the EU legal order may now come at this price. 
 Secondly, the questioning of judicial law in the EU. The role of the Court in EU 
law-making is being challenged, especially when contrasted with that of EU Mem-
ber States. Of course, the opposition between legislation and judicial law is com-
mon in any democracy. What is specifi c in the EU, however, is that it is also a polity 
of democratic states. 84 This implies that the democratic legitimacy of judicial law 
also needs to be accounted for from an inter-state perspective. In this context, one 
may hope the CJEU could refer more regularly and more rigorously to EUCL to 
support its reasoning and interpretations in the future. This is even more impor-
tant after  Opinion 2/13 and the direction in which the CJEU is leading the Member 
States in terms of international law. 85 
 IV. General Principles  qua EU Customary Law 
 Based on the previous sections, I would now like to argue that some general prin-
ciples of EU law, ie those that derive from the Member States ’ legal orders, are 
best approached as customary law principles (IV.A). I will illustrate this point in a 
specifi c context, that of EU fundamental rights (IV.B). 
 82  See  M  Dawson and  F  de Witte ,  ‘ Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis ’ ( 2013 ) 
 76  Modern Law Review  817 – 44 . See also Case C-370/12  Pringle [published in the electronic Reports of 
Cases] EU:C:2012:756; Case C-62/14  Gauweiler and Others [nyr] EU:C:2015:400. 
 83  See Blanchet and Keller-No ë llet (n 9) 250 – 51. 
 84  See  S  Besson ,  ‘ European Human Rights, Supranational Judicial Review and Democracy — 
Thinking Outside the Judicial Box ’ in  P  Popelier ,  C  Van de Heyning and  P  Van Nuffel (eds),  Human 
Rights Protection in the European Legal Order :  The Interaction Between the European and the National 
Courts ( Cambridge ,  Intersentia ,  2011 )  97 – 145 . 
 85  See PJ Kuijper,  ‘ Reaction to Leonard Besselink ’ s ACELG Blog ’ ,  https://acelg.blogactiv.
eu/2015/01/06/reaction-to-leonard-besselinks%E2%80%99s-acelg-blog/ , accessed 1 September 2015. 
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 A.  Sources of General Principles Common to the 
Laws of the Member States 
 Many EUGP arise from inter-state practice and come very close to customary gen-
eral principles. This is clearly the case of the EUGP that are  ‘ common to the laws 
of EU Member States ’ . While these principles are one out of four types of EUGP, 
they are also the most specifi c ones in EU law and the kind of general principles 
that have been most prevalent in the EU legal order. 
 As a matter of fact, EUGP and EUCL are even more intimately related than 
general principles and custom in other legal orders. Indeed, they share similar 
identification and formation criteria. First of all, the comparative law method 
used by the CJEU in ascertaining the existence of some EUGP 86 is reminiscent 
of the method used by domestic or international courts to establish the inter-
state practice constitutive of customary law. Secondly, the inter-state practice 
the CJEU is after is general only, and need not be unanimous for a general 
principle to be considered as sufficiently common to become an EU general 
principle. Thirdly, the reference to domestic case law in that context comes 
close to the establishment of EU Member States ’  opinio juris : the practice of 
domestic courts is indeed evidence of the grounds for compliance behind the 
practice. 
 All this confi rms that EUCL could in fact be regarded as the source of some 
EUGP. If this is the case, it is important the CJEU acknowledges and complies with 
customary law reasoning in all cases pertaining to the general principles common 
to EU Member States. 
 This would be particularly justified now that the increasing relevance of 
EUGP in the EU legal order and their development by the CJEU are facing 
challenges. Some of these challenges could indeed be met were the customary 
source of some EUGP clearly recognised and the Court ’ s reasoning adapted 
accordingly. This is the case primarily of the need to enhance the constraints 
on the CJEU ’ s law-making powers and judicial reasoning. EUCL has  indirect 
democratic credentials that derive from (non-judicial) inter-state practice that 
EUGP do not have in this respect. A second challenge lies in the  ‘ competence 
creep ’ through EUGP that some have identified in practice. 87 The customary 
law-ascertainment process in the Court ’ s reasoning could  contribute to make 
those principles more attuned to an inter-state and inter-institutional prac-
tice in a given area and hence to preserving the allocation of powers within 
the EU. 
 86  See Case C-11/70  Handelsgesellschaft (n 29). 
 87  See eg Prechal (n 36). 
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 B. EU Fundamental Rights  qua EU Customary Law 
 Among the EUGP that stem from EU Member States ’ common principles, the 
most historical and fundamental ones in the EU legal order are EU fundamental 
rights. They developed as general principles through the CJEU ’ s case law. 88 
 As a matter of fact, EUGP are still recognised as a source of these rights now 
that EU fundamental rights have been codifi ed into the EU Fundamental Rights 
Charter (Article 6(3) TEU; Article 52(4) EUFRC; Preamble to the EUFRC) and 
in other parts of EU primary and secondary law. True, from 2010 onwards, the 
Charter has been treated as a starting point in the CJEU ’ s reasoning on EU funda-
mental rights. 89 However, this has not always been followed strictly. Importantly, 
moreover, this does not imply a priority in reasoning with either a Charter right 
or a general principle, nor a formal hierarchy in case of confl ict between them. 
As I explained before, indeed, the normative relations between EUGP, on the one 
hand, and between EUGP and other sources of EU law, on the other, do not fi t 
the formal hierarchy of sources very well in practice. Thus, no formal priority or 
hierarchy should be assumed between the EU fundamental rights of Article 6(1) 
and (3) TEU depending on their respective sources (see also Article 52(4) EUFRC 
a fortiori). 90 
 Based on my argument in the previous section, EU fundamental rights could 
actually be approached as customary in source. Not only does this interpretation 
fi t the sources of EU fundamental rights, but it also best justifi es their specifi cities. 
 In terms of sources, on the one hand, EU fundamental rights are said to arise 
bottom-up from EU Member States ’ respective internal practices of fundamental 
rights. Once there is suffi cient commonality in that practice, even if it is not unani-
mous as confi rmed by the CJEU in the  Omega case, 91 these rights may become EU 
fundamental rights. Moreover, EU fundamental rights work as protection  maxima 
and not as minimal thresholds of protection. 92 Both features are best explained by 
reference to their customary source. 
 88  See eg  Case C-29/69  Stauder [ 1969 ]  ECR 419 EU:C:1969:57 , para 7;  Case C-4/73  Nold [ 1974 ] 
 ECR 491 EU:C:1974:51 , para 13; Case C-11/70  Handelsgesellschaft (n 29) paras 3 – 4. See, more recently, 
 Case C-521/09 P  Elf Aquitaine v Commission [ 2011 ]  ECR I-8947 EU:C:2011:620 , para 112;  Case 
C-571/10  Kamberaj [ published in the electronic Reports of Cases ]  EU:C:2012:233 , paras 60 – 61. 
 89  See eg  Joined Cases C-92/09 and 93/09  Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert Schecke [ 2010 ]  ECR 
I-11063 EU:C:2010:662 ;  Case C-236/09  Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others 
[ 2011 ]  ECR I-773 EU:C:2011:100 . 
 90  See  H  Hoffmann and  B  Mihaescu ,  ‘ Relation between Charter ’ s Fundamental Rights and 
Unwritten General Principles ’ ( 2013 )  9  European Constitutional Law Review  73–101, 77 – 82 . See also 
Case C-604/12  HN [nyr] EU:C:2014:302. 
 91  See Case C-36/02  Omega (n 30) paras 34 – 35. 
 92  See  LFM  Besselink ,  ‘ Entrapped by the Maximum Standard :  On Fundamental Rights, Plural-
ism and Subsidiarity in the European Union ’ ( 1998 )  35  Common Market Law Review  629 – 80 and 
 JHH  Weiler ,  ‘ Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries :  On the Confl ict of Standards and 
Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the European Legal Space ’ in  JHH  Weiler ,  The Constitution 
of Europe ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press,  1999 )  102 – 29 . See also  Case C-550/07 P  Akzo Nobel 
Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [ 2010 ]  ECR I-8301 EU:C:2010:512 . 
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 On the other hand, the customary approach to EU fundamental rights best 
accounts for their specifi cities in practice. 
 First of all, the function of EU fundamental rights may be compared neither to 
domestic (federal) fundamental rights nor to international fundamental rights. 93 
This can be checked easily by reference to their personal (Article 51(1) EUFRC) 94 
and material scope (Article 51(1) EUFRC), but also to their maximal rather 
than minimal nature (Article 53 EUFRC). 95 These two features are best justifi ed 
if the sources of EU fundamental rights are considered to be transnational and 
to grow out of the intra- and inter-state practice of EU Member States, rather 
than imposed top-down and in a centralised fashion on them. Second, there is no 
general human rights competence of the EU. EU fundamental rights have indeed 
grown out of domestic fundamental rights in joint spheres of competence. 96 The 
customary account of the sources of EU fundamental rights therefore succeeds in 
squaring the human rights duties of EU Member States nicely with the principle 
of conferral of powers. 
 Third, EU fundamental rights are only rarely applied and interpreted in con-
junction with international human rights (except for the ECHR on grounds of 
Article 53(3) EUFRC). This is best justifi ed by reference to the customary and 
transnational nature of EU fundamental rights: it is because EU fundamental 
rights have grown from the inside and from each Member State ’ s practice as an 
integrated 97 fundamental rights regime that they are not concerned with minimal 
external guarantees that apply directly to those Member States ’ own fundamental 
rights regimes. Finally, EU fundamental rights work as unwritten constitutional 
constraints on EU primary law. This is best justifi ed again once their sources are 
considered as customary and concurrent to EU primary law, rather than internal 
to the latter (see also Article 52(4) EUFRC a fortiori with respect to the Charter 
itself and Article 6(1) TEU). This is a common argument made about domestic 
constitutional customary law and its role as supra-constitutional constraint. 
 93  Of course, with the development of EU democracy and citizenship, this intermediary trans-
national position held by EU fundamental rights has become increasingly uncomfortable: see eg 
Case C-617/10  Å kerberg Fransson [published in the electronic Reports of Cases] EU:C:2013:105, 
para 29 and Case C-399/11  Melloni [published in the electronic Reports of Cases] EU:C:2013:107, 
para 60. See  S  Besson ,  ‘ The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights – A 
Quiet (R)Evolution ’ ( 2015 )  32  Social Philosophy  & Policy  244–268, 265 – 66 . 
 94  See Case C-617/10  Fransson (n 93) para 29. 
 95  See Case C-399/11  Melloni (n 93) para 60. 
 96  See  S  Besson ,  ‘ The Human Rights Competence in the EU — The State of the Question after 
Lisbon ’ in  G  Kofl er ,  M  Poiares Maduro and  P  Pistone (eds),  Taxation and Human Rights in Europe and 
in the World ,  5th GREIT Conference ( Amsterdam ,  IBFD ,  2011 )  37 – 63 . 
 97  See  P  Eeckhout ,  ‘ Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law :  Pluralism or Integration? ’ ( 2013 ) 
66  Current Legal Problems  169–202 . See also  S  Besson ,  ‘ Human Rights and Constitutional Law :  Mutual 
Validation and Legitimation ’ in  S  Rowan Cruft ,  M  Liao and  M  Renzo (eds),  Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2015 )  279 – 99 ;  S  Besson ,  ‘ European Human Rights 
Pluralism — Notion and Justifi cation ’ in  M  Poiares Maduro ,  K  Tuori and  S  Sankari (eds),  Transnational 
Law — Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2014 ) 
 170 – 205 . 
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 One should therefore hope for more consideration of the customary source 
of EU fundamental rights in future reasoning by the CJEU. Some authors, such 
as Grainne de B ú rca, 98 have actually already recommended, albeit on different 
grounds, that the Court resorts to a more rigorous comparative law method in its 
human rights reasoning. 99 This would actually merely imply a return to the com-
parative fundamental rights reasoning used by the Court in its original decisions 
on fundamental rights. 100 
 V. Conclusions 
 The doctrine of sources constitutes an interesting angle to grasp the comparative 
nature and role of EUGP in the EU legal order. Unlike previous research on the 
topic, this chapter ’ s comparative focus has not been on their relationship to EU 
primary law, but to another source of unwritten EU law: EUCL. 
 Contrary to what is the case in domestic and international law, customary law 
has been largely neglected in the EU legal order, and so has its relation to EUGP. 
This is particularly striking as the latter relationship has long obsessed domestic 
and international lawyers. There have been different reasons for these debates in 
domestic and international law: both general principles and customary law are 
unwritten sources of law, and they actually share some dimensions in their identi-
fi cation and formation processes; there is an ambivalence between general princi-
ples  qua source and  qua type of norms, and customary law is actually the source of 
many principles  qua norms; fi nally, that ambivalence has been used strategically, 
especially in international law, to escape the conditions of identifi cation and for-
mation of one or both sources. 
 This chapter started by fl eshing out the comparative imbalance in EU law 
between the qualitative and quantitative importance of EUGP and the relative 
irrelevance of EUCL. Some reasons for the reluctance towards EUCL in EU law 
have been identifi ed and then debunked in the chapter: the supranationality of 
EU law, its democratic legitimacy, its idiosyncratic vertical and horizontal divi-
sion of powers, and its jurisprudential nature. The chapter also explained how 
some of these grounds are currently under strain and are turning into arguments 
 98  See  G  de B ú rca ,  ‘ After the Charter of EU Fundamental Rights :  The Court of Justice as a Human 
Rights Adjudicator ?’ ( 2013 )  20  Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law  168–184, 171 – 4 . 
 99  On comparative or transnational human rights law in general, see eg Besson (n 97);  S  Besson , 
 ‘ Human Rights as Transnational Constitutional Law ’ in  A  Lang and  A  Wiener (eds),  Global Constitu-
tionalism Handbook ( London ,  Edward Elgar ,  2017 ,  forthcoming ) ;  C  McCrudden ,  ‘ A Common Law of 
Human Rights :  Transnational Judicial Conversations on Human Rights ’ ( 2000 )  20  Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies  499 – 532, 530 . 
 100  See eg Case C-29/69  Stauder (n 88); Case C-4/73  Nold (n 88); Case C-11/70  Handelsgesellschaft 
(n 29). 
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for EUCL. The EU is changing internally, but also externally in its relationship to 
other states and international organisations. In these circumstances, EUCL may 
have a new role to play, especially in light of two important challenges: the role of 
international law in the EU and the growing critique of the role of the CJEU. 
 After exploring EUGP ’ s and EUCL ’ s respective types, sources (respectively, 
source-based relations) and functions in EU law by comparison to domestic and 
international law, this chapter uncovered and explained some of their ties both in 
terms of functions and of sources. On that basis, it argued that the most impor-
tant EUGP for the development of the EU legal order, ie the general principles 
common to the laws of EU Member States, are best understood as customary law 
principles. This approach accounts in particular for their convergent practice of 
identifi cation that is comparative, general and judicial. The argument was then 
exemplifi ed in the fi eld of EU fundamental rights. The proposed customary read-
ing of EU fundamental rights not only accounts for the practice of identifi cation 
of these rights and their role in EU law, but justifi es some of their specifi c traits, 
and in particular: their transnational nature by contrast to both domestic or inter-
national human rights law; their remote relation to international human rights 
law; their concurrent relationship to EU primary law; and the lack of a general 
fundamental rights competence of the EU. 
 The upshot of the proposed argument is the enhanced legitimacy of EUGP  qua 
EUCL. The customary reading helps to address some of the current challenges fac-
ing EUGP. It makes those principles arguably less dependent on judicial law and 
the CJEU, more comparative and less threatening to the vertical and horizontal 
allocation of powers within the EU. In the context of EU fundamental rights, this 
argument is also a signal to the CJEU whose future case law on human rights could 
gain in democratic legitimacy were it to be more comparative and attuned to the 
domestic practices of EU Member States. 
 
 

